Currency Compositions of International Reserves and the Euro Crisis by Laser, Falk Hendrik & Weidner, Jan
 Arbeitspapiere der Volkswirtschaftlichen Fachgebiete der TU Darmstadt 
ISSN: 1438-2733 
 
 
Darmstadt 
Discussion Papers 
in ECONOMICS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Currency Compositions of International Reserves and the Euro Crisis  
 
Falk Hendrik Laser and Jan Weidner 
 
 
Nr. 238 
 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any 
additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copy or 
electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, 
reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1438-2733 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Falk Hendrik Laser and Jan Weidner, 2020 
Printed in Germany 
Technische Universität Darmstadt 
Department of Law and Economics 
D – 64289 Darmstadt 
Germany 
www.wi.tu-darmstadt.de 
Currency Compositions of International
Reserves and the Euro Crisis
Falk Hendrik Laser* Jan Weidner†
February 17, 2020
Abstract: During recent years, central banks have increased the levels of their
international reserves at an unprecedented pace. In this paper, we introduce new
country-specific reserve data and examine determinants of the composition of inter-
national reserves. Using a dataset of 36 countries (and the euro area) for the years
from 1996 to 2016, we identify currency pegs and trade patterns as determinants of
currency compositions. Our results emphasize the importance of transaction moti-
ves for the composition of currency reserves. The euro crisis appears to have been
a setback for the euro, which temporarily seemed to challenge the US dollar as the
most important international reserve currency and potentially impacted the deter-
mination of international reserve compositions.
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1 Introduction
Only recently the European Commission presented ambitious plans for a stronger role of
the common European currency in the world as expressed by its president Jean-Claude
Juncker in his State of the Union Address (Juncker, 2018). Moreover, a recent press
release of the European Commission mentions concrete measures, for instance the pro-
motion of the euro (EUR) as a means of payment in key strategic sectors such as energy
markets or the establishment of an integrated European instant payment system suitable
for strengthening the EUR in international currency reserve markets (European Com-
mission, 2018). Given the mixed performance of the EUR with regard to its perceived
stability during the euro crisis and its decreasing relative importance as an international
reserve currency, it is difficult to assess the prospects of success measured against these
ambitions (Maggiori et al. (2019) and The Economist (2019)).
It is not only since Mr. Juncker’s announcement that international reserves have been
of considerable interest for both academics and policy makers. International currency
reserves not only increasingly play an important role for international currency markets
and exchange rates but also more broadly in terms of geopolitics and the global economy.
During recent years, holdings of international reserves have grown at an extremely fast
pace, as shown by Figure 1. According to the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)
international reserves have seen nearly a sevenfold increase over the last two decades and
have grown from 1.6tn US dollars (USD) in 1996 to 10.7tn USD in 2016 (International
Monetary Fund, 2016b).1 This development has largely been driven by a small group of
countries, as the ten biggest holders of reserves account for 70% of worldwide international
reserves. China and Japan alone managed around 39% of worldwide international reserves
in 2016.2
The academic literature dealing with international reserves can broadly be separated
1In its Balance of Payments Manuel, the IMF defines international reserves as “those external assets
that are readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities for meeting balance of payments
financing needs, for intervention in exchange markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for other
related purposes (such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and serving as a basis
for foreign borrowing)”(International Monetary Fund, 2007).
2Table A1 in the appendix reports the ten biggest holders of international reserves in 2016, of which
seven are located in Asia.
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Figure 1: Volume of international reserves (in trillion USD)
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ves volumes without gold. The bars (right axis) display respective year-over-year
growth rates. [Please use colors in print.]
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
into research questions concerning what determines the size of a country’s overall reserve
holdings and those concerning a country’s drivers for its currency composition. We focus
on the latter. While empirical examinations of currency compositions are hampered by
limited access to relevant IMF data on country-specific reserve compositions, we compile
a new dataset based on all countries publicly disclosing their data.
Making use of country-specific data, we test the relevance of transaction motives in
determining currency compositions. Transaction motives with respect to the currency
compositions of foreign exchange reserves refer to bolstering a country’s preparedness
for potential foreign exchange interventions, current account interventions, or temporary
import financing. Our main findings suggest that currency compositions of internatio-
nal reserves under central bank management are influenced by currency pegs and trade
patterns. Thus we are able to confirm previous academic findings (see Heller and Knight
(1978), Dooley et al. (1989), Eichengreen et al. (2000) and recently Aizenman et al.
(2019)). Unlike these papers, we place more focus on the specific role of the EUR, which
since its introduction has been considered a serious competitor to the USD on internati-
onal currency reserve markets by some. For instance, Bergsten (1997) calls the EUR the
new rival to the USD and expects the establishment of a ‘bipolar currency regime’ and
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Chinn and Frankel (2008) describe scenarios in which the EUR will replace the USD as
the main international reserve currency.
In particular, we aim to disentangle the impact of the euro crisis on the euro’s role as an
international reserve currency. Splitting the sample into pre-crisis and crisis subsamples,
we analyze the effect of the crisis on the determinants of currency compositions. We
identify a significant and negative impact of the euro crisis on EUR holdings across
countries. Additionally, our findings suggest that the euro crisis impacted on the effect
of the determinants of currency compositions, rendering proxies for bilateral economic
interdependence more relevant. We cautiously interpret this as a setback for the EUR as
an international reserve currency. In a final exercise, we use our model to predict currency
compositions of the three most important non-disclosing holders of international reserves,
China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we address the related literature.
In section 3, we present our data and descriptive findings. Section 4 is dedicated to
analyzing determinants of country-specific reserve compositions, the role of the euro crisis
and provides predictions of currency shares for non-disclosing countries. In section 5, we
summarize and discuss our findings.
2 Literature
We present the related literature in two subsections. The first covers contributions analy-
zing the general level of international reserve holdings, the second focuses on contributions
dealing with the composition of reserves.
2.1 Motives for International Reserve Holdings
The literature addressing the question of why countries hold international reserves iden-
tifies three main motives: A precautionary motive, a mercantilist motive, and an in-
vestment motive. In one of the earlier works discussing international reserves, Heller
(1966) distinguishes between a precautionary, a speculative, and an investment motive
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for holding international reserves. He finds precautionary motives to be the most relevant
and derives the need to finance imbalances in a country’s international accounts as the
main rationale for holding reserves. Heller (1966) computes optimal reserve levels for 60
countries by minimizing the costs of adjustment to external imbalances and the costs of
holding international reserves given a positive probability of having to adjust. Another
contribution representing a precautionary motive stance is Calvo et al. (2012), which
addresses the question of the optimal reserve level in the face of a sudden stop. The
authors use a statistical model assuming that central bankers choose the desired reserve
level of reserves by weighting the expected costs of a sudden stop against the opportunity
costs of holding international reserves. They find that de-facto reserve levels were close
to optimal on the eve of the Global Financial Crisis and do not find evidence for the
mercantilist motive.
Dooley et al. (2003) are among the proponents of a mercantilist motive view and ex-
plain the accumulation of international reserves in Asia with export-led growth strategies.
To them, the motive for holding international reserves is to influence the exchange rate
to foster competitiveness (through undervaluation). Aizenman and Lee (2008) assess the
importance of the mercantilist motive empirically and focus on developing countries from
1980 to 2000. They find that the precautionary motive better explains the accumulation
of international reserves. They point out the high potential costs caused by a sudden
stop.
Rodrik (2006), among others, views the high and increasing levels of international
reserves as a protection against financial crises but raises the question of the related costs
of these holdings, suggesting an investment motive. Due to the low level of interest earned
on international reserves and the cost of foreign borrowing, Rodrik (2006) estimates an
income loss of around 1 percentage point of GDP for developing countries.
Goldberg et al. (2013) provide an overview of the subject of international reserves,
focusing on industrialized countries from a central bank perspective. They address, inter
alia, the questions of why industrialized countries hold high levels of international reserves
(e.g. manage exchange rates, “calm disorderly markets”, “insure against liquidity losses
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and disruptions to capital market access”) and what are adequate levels of reserves.
2.2 Determinants of Currency Compositions
The previously discussed issue of why countries amass foreign exchange reserves is linked
to the question of how central banks choose the currency composition of their foreign ex-
change reserves. On this subject, the literature mainly distinguishes between transaction
and classical portfolio investment considerations. Transaction motives with respect to
the currency composition of the foreign exchange reserve portfolio arise from the cen-
tral bank’s potential need to conduct foreign exchange interventions, current account
interventions, or temporary import financing. The portfolio investment motive is charac-
terized by a yield/risk trade-off. However, it is generally agreed upon that central banks
exhibit a lower risk tolerance than private investors.
Empirical investigations in this field are often hampered by poor data availability.
One important source is the IMF’s COFER database (International Monetary Fund,
2016a). On very rare occasions, the IMF grants access to its confidential country-specific
data. Three important contributions based on these data are closely related to our
paper. Heller and Knight (1978) stress the importance of transaction motives. Using a
panel of 76 countries for the period 1970-76, they find a relation between trade patterns
and the exchange rate regime of a country with the currency composition of its foreign
exchange reserves. Analyzing an updated version of the dataset, Dooley et al. (1989)
confirm this finding for the years 1976-86. Additionally, they find that the denomination
of a country’s debt is related to the currency composition of this country’s international
reserves. Eichengreen et al. (2000), assessing a panel of 84 countries over the period
1979-96, find further evidence that trade flows, financial flows, and currency pegs are the
principal determinants of a country’s currency composition.
Other contributions are based on publicly accessible data. For instance, Wong (2007)
extracts information from central bank annual reports on international reserves of 23
countries to analyze diversification. For the years 2000-2005, she finds evidence for net
stabilizing interventions. This implies that central banks increase their foreign currency
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shares as a response to devaluation and vice versa. In another study, Chinn and Frankel
(2008) rely on aggregated COFER data for the years 1973-2007 and estimate a model
using characteristics of the currency issuing country to explain shares of major currencies.
They identify the relative size of the home country, a proxy for the relative size of the
domestic trading place, and the exchange rate volatility of the respective currency as
significant determinants. In two out of several possible scenarios the EUR is expected
to surpass the USD (by 2015 and by 2022 respectively). Eichengreen et al. (2016) use
data on aggregated currency compositions from 1947 to 2013 to investigate whether
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system had an impact on the above mentioned
determinants. Including a measure of persistence, they find support for strong inertia
in currency compositions and their determinants. Additionally, they suggest a smaller
effect of the relative size of the home country’s economy after Bretton Woods and weaker
network effects.
Recently, Aizenman et al. (2019) have examined a possible regime change since the
financial crisis concerning currency compositions and the demand for reserves. Using
aggregated shares of the four largest reserve currencies they confirm previous findings
that trade and debt denominated in the major reserve currencies drive reserve holdings
of the major reserve currencies. Moreover, they find that higher reserve ratios relative to
GDP and a shortage of global safe assets may have strengthened the concentration of the
reserve holdings towards the major global currencies. Ito and McCauley (2019) observe
a relation between the currency composition of reserves and the denomination of trade
invoicing as well as with currency co-movements
On the theoretical side, one strand of the literature is concerned with modeling optimal
currency composition according to a Markowitz-type portfolio problem, i.e. trading off
expected return versus risk. In this sense, Ben-Bassat (1980) formulates the problem as
minimizing the variance at a given return for a basket of import currencies. Using data
from 1976 to 1980 and comparing optimal and actual currency compositions, he finds
evidence for different roles of portfolio objectives across groups of countries. These are
more relevant for developing countries and semi–industrial countries than for industrial
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countries. Papaioannou et al. (2006) develop a mean-variance optimization framework
including portfolio rebalancing costs and constraints mirroring a central bank’s desire
to hold some amount of currency reserves in the currency of its peg, of its main trading
partners, and of its outstanding debt. They find that, once the dollar is assigned the status
of the reference (risk-free) currency, optimal share as suggested by the model and actual
shares match well. Observed EUR shares, however, exceed optimal shares. The authors
explain this finding with the euro’s partial use as an international reserve currency. Beck
and Rahbari (2008) build a model embedding transaction motives to mitigate the effect of
sudden stops into the minimum variance framework. They identify two separate rationales
for currency compositions, these being classical portfolio objectives and hedging demands
to counter effects of sudden stops. They argue that the importance of hedging demands
decreases with declining debt to reserve ratios. Furthermore, they suggest that the USD is
relatively more in demand than the EUR as a hedge against sudden stops in Latin America
and Asia. Contrarily, in Emerging Europe the EUR appears to be the more relevant
hedge currency. Beck and Weber (2011) consider optimal levels and the composition
of international reserve level jointly in one model. In their contribution they refute the
common belief that higher levels of international reserves necessarily come along with
more diversification and attribute this to precautionary motives.
While the previously mentioned contributions focus on economic explanations of in-
ternational reserve compositions, political factors also play a role. Only few would deny
that the unique role of the USD as an international reserve currency, and thus the Uni-
ted States’ so-called “exorbitant privilege”, is also the result of its political weight in the
world. For example, according to Posen (2008) foreign reserve holdings “depend as much
on foreign policy as economics”, while stressing the particular importance of security
ties and pointing to high USD holdings of states as different as Saudi Arabia, Panama
and Taiwan. Frankel (2012) states that from a historical perspective the status of an
international reserve currency has been associated with political and military strength
and prestige. Another recent contribution to the literature focusing on political factors
is Eichengreen et al. (2017). In this piece of work, the authors explain countries’ re-
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serve currency preferences as a function of their dependence on the US for their security
reasons.
3 Data and Descriptives
3.1 Data
Empirical work on the composition of international reserves has been somewhat limited
by the discretion exercised by authorities in charge of reserve management. There are
three main sources which provide insight into international reserves and its composition.
The most general source is IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), comprising the
overall reserve holdings of most countries in the world. The IMF’s COFER database
as another potential data source contains aggregated reserve holdings broken down by
major international reserve currencies (International Monetary Fund, 2016a). It does
not show individual reserve holdings and reporting is on a voluntary basis. Furthermore,
of 145 reporting countries only 97 are listed by name on the IMF webpage. A third
source consists of national data and is the foundation of this paper. To our knowledge, a
total of 36 countries (plus the euro area) individually disclose the currency composition
of their international reserves in different ways (mostly central bank annual reports).
The advantage of this source is that it allows us to draw conclusions about the currency
composition of worldwide total international reserves as well as about country-specific
foreign reserve compositions. At the same time, this source is selective as the majority
of central banks still prefer not to disclose currency compositions of their international
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reserves.3 4
The total volume of international reserves in our dataset accounts for more than one
fifth of the total COFER reserves (22.2%) and for more than one fourth of the allocated
COFER reserves (29.0%) in 2016. Table A2 in the appendix compares our dataset with
both the IFS and COFER datasets of the IMF in terms of scope and level of aggregation.
Table A3 in the appendix provides the coverage of countries of our data and the respective
sources.
3.2 Descriptives
Our individual country data displays the same strong and parallel increase in international
reserves and the domination of the USD over the last decade as shown by the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics and the IMF’s COFER statistics. Figure 2 shows that
the USD was able to successfully defend its positions as the world’s main international
reserve currency.
Our unbalanced panel consists of 23 countries from Europe (plus the euro area), six
countries from the Americas, four countries from Asia, Mozambique as the only African
country and Australia and New Zealand (Table A4 in the appendix lists all countries
in our sample). Following the IMF World Economic Outlook classification, 21 countries
(plus the euro area) are considered industrial countries and 15 are classified as emerging
economies. Despite an overrepresentation of European countries, our sample includes
countries from all regions of the world with a considerable variance in terms of economic
3To date, disclosure of currency compositions of international reserves is voluntary and left to the
discretion of responsible authorities. For example, the non-binding IMF “Guidelines for Foreign Exchange
Reserve Management” or the “Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial
Policies” promote more disclosure in the field of reserve management. We suppose that in the case of
many, but not all, non-disclosing institutions either political considerations or fear of more unfavorable
market conditions play a role. In a conference speech, former Bank of International Settlements Managing
Director Malcom Knight summarized the trade-off between more or less disclosure from the point of view
of an individual central bank as follows: “In general, disclosure of the level and composition of official
reserve holdings has the virtue of improving public accountability regarding the management of public
funds. But there is also a risk that opaque private portfolios might gain some, potentially lucrative,
advantage over transparent public reserve portfolios” (Knight, 2006).
4Furthermore, in 2015, the IMF conducted an ad-hoc survey of its member states’ foreign currencies
holdings for 2013 and 2014 and published (aggregated) summary results. For a total of 130 responding
monetary authorities it reveals which foreign currency assets were held by how many countries and at
what size (International Monetary Fund, 2015).
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Figure 2: Holdings in major reserve currencies (in trillion USD)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
USD EUR JPY GBP AUD total
Notes: The graph shows aggregated reserve holdings for the five major currencies
in our dataset. [Please use colors in print.]
Source: Own data (mostly annual reports of central banks, see Table A3).
development. Still, we are aware that we have to be cautious with regard to the generality
of our results. The decision to disclose currency compositions might not be orthogonal
to the mechanism driving currency compositions.
In total, our panel dataset contains the individual international reserve compositions
of 36 disclosing countries (plus the euro area) and includes the eight major reserve curren-
cies for different time spans between 1996 and 2016. In the euro area, both the national
central banks and the European Central Bank (ECB) manage foreign reserves. In 2016,
the ECB’s international reserves were composed of around 83% USD-denominated and
17% JPY-denominated assets. The eight major currencies in our sample are the USD,
the EUR, the Japanese yen (JPY), the Canadian dollar (CAD), the Chinese renminbi
(CNY), the British pound (GBP), the Deutsche mark (DEM), the Swiss franc (CHF),
and the Australian dollar (AUD). The entire (unbalanced) panel roughly contains 4,300
observations. In our empirical analysis, we will focus on the four most important inter-
national reserve currencies, the USD, the EUR, the JPY and the GBP which all have a
substantial average share throughout the given time period.
In order to discuss a few trends, we observe developments for a total of 30 central
banks which are consistently part of our panel for the period 2006-2016.5 Our data
5This contrasts to our empirical analysis, for which we include the full sample.
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shows the direction in which the percentage shares of the eight major reserve currencies
have evolved. Data gaps prevent doing so for the other central banks of the sample.
For instance, 16 countries increased the proportion of USD in their international assets,
while 12 countries reduced their exposure to the USD. Only seven countries increased
their EUR share and a total of 17 countries decreased their EUR share. This is partly
due to some countries introducing the EUR, which implied that EUR-denominated assets
are no longer considered part of their international reserves. For the period under review,
the AUD and the CAD experienced increased demand as no country or only a few reduced
their reserve assets (0 and 2 respectively) while many countries increased their reserve
shares (11 and 8 respectively).
In terms of (unweighted) aggregated reserves in our sample, the share of the USD
slightly increased from 52.8% to 53.6%, whereas the share of the EUR decreased from
33% to 30.2%. Shares of the AUD and the CAD increased from 0.1% to 1.6% and 0.4% to
2.1% respectively. The CNY, often regarded as the rising international reserve currency,
was certainly no international reserve currency by 2006, but by 2015 it had become part
of the official international reserves of Australia, Italy, and New Zealand even though its
share of the total international reserves has so far remained negligible (0.1% in 2016). The
JPY and the GBP have remained rivals for the position of the world’s third international
reserve currency, with shares fluctuating between 4% and 5%. Furthermore, it seems that
countries increasingly diversify their foreign reserves portfolio. Indications hereof are a
higher number of reserve currencies over time in our panel and also in the IMF COFER
database, which was extended in the last years by the AUD, the CAD (both 2013),
and the CNY (2016). Table 1 presents aggregated currency shares in our sample for all
countries, industrial and emerging economies respectively and shows that the EUR and
the GBP gained shares in the early stage after the introduction of the EUR, especially
in emerging economies. Table A5 in the appendix reports country specific international
reserve compositions.
In our empirical analysis we include as control variables dummies denoting currency
pegs to the two main reserve currencies USD and EUR and variables measuring bilateral
11
Table 1: Share of currencies in total reserve holdings (percent)
Currency 1996 2000 2006 2010 2016
All countries
US dollar 80.5 58.5 52.8 48.6 53.6
Euro 0.0 27.2 33.0 36.4 30.2
Japanese yen 3.5 11.0 5.0 5.3 3.6
British pound 0.1 2.1 3.8 4.5 4.4
others 15.9 1.1 5.4 5.2 8.2
Industrial countries
US dollar 80.5 58.0 54.0 51.2 54.9
Euro 0.0 27.3 30.4 32.0 28.8
Japanese yen 3.5 11.3 6.0 8.0 5.0
British pound 0.1 2.2 3.9 2.3 4.0
others 15.9 1.2 5.7 6.5 7.3
Emerging economies
US dollar / 72.6 47.5 44.8 50.2
Euro / 24.8 44.7 43.1 34.1
Japanese yen / 1.2 0.1 1.1 0.0
British pound / 0.7 3.7 7.7 5.4
others / 0.7 4.0 3.3 10.3
Notes: This table presents aggregated currency shares
for our sample for all countries, industrial countries and
emerging economies.
Source: Own data (mostly annual reports of central
banks, see Table A3).
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economic dependencies between holding countries and the currency-emitting countries.
We concretely proxy bilateral relations via trade, foreign currency public debt and lia-
bilities in currency reserves of the private banking sector. Table 2 presents descriptive
statistics for the main currency shares and the control variables. Further, Table A6 in
the appendix reports the sources of our set of explanatory variables. In our sample, the
USD on average exhibits the highest share with 46% followed by the EUR with 38%.
Countries in our sample import substantially less from the US than from the euro area
(8.6% vs. 29%), while external debt (59% vs. 26%) and liabilities (56% vs. 14%) are on
average more likely to be denoted in USD than in EUR.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N N if = 0 N if = 1
USD .46 .3 0 1 507 30 11
EUR .38 .32 0 1 507 119 7
JPY .048 .093 0 .57 507 247 0
GBP .036 .063 0 .41 507 292 0
pegUSD .033 .18 0 1 665 643 22
pegEUR .18 .38 0 1 665 548 117
importsfromUSA .086 .11 0 .68 764 21 0
importsfromEA .29 .18 0 .79 767 21 0
importsfromJapan .034 .036 0 .22 764 77 0
importsfromUK .034 .028 0 .22 764 25 0
debtUSD .59 .24 .011 .99 228 0 0
debtEUR .26 .27 .00032 .97 176 0 0
debtJPY .063 .098 0 .4 228 9 0
debtGBP .0017 .0041 0 .024 228 113 0
liabilitiesUSD .56 .26 0 .99 217 21 0
liabilitiesEUR .14 .17 0 .64 223 92 0
liabilitiesJPY .037 .044 0 .21 200 45 0
liabilitiesGBP .061 .048 0 .19 197 38 0
Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics for the variables used in the em-
pirical analyzes covering the years from 1996-2016. All variables except for the
peg dummies are shares. Differences in the number of observations across variables
result from different coverages across data sources.
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate
Restrictions (AREAER), UN Comtrade Database, Eurostat, World Bank Interna-
tional Debt Statistics (IDS), Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Locational
Banking Statistics (LBS) and own data (mostly annual reports of central banks, see
Table A3).
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Model
We examine the determinants of currency compositions of international reserves following
Dooley et al. (1989) and Eichengreen et al. (2000). To this end, we estimate the following
panel model in different configurations:
𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
=𝛽0 +
2∑︁
𝑠=1
𝛽1,𝑠𝐸𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 +
4∑︁
𝑘=1,𝑘 ̸=𝑖
𝛽2,𝑘
(︂
𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡
𝐼𝑀 𝑖,𝑡
)︂
+
4∑︁
𝑘=1,𝑘 ̸=𝑖
𝛽3,𝑘
(︂
𝐷𝑖,𝑘,𝑡
𝐷𝑖,𝑡
)︂
+
4∑︁
𝑘=1,𝑘 ̸=𝑖
𝛽4,𝑘
(︂
𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡
𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡
)︂
+ 𝜇𝑖,𝑡,
𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑛, 𝑘 = 1, ..., 4, 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇, 𝑠 = 1, 2.
(1)
𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 denotes the end-of-period reserves of country i in the reserve currency of country k
at time t, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total end-of-period amount of foreign exchange reserves for country i
at time t. Analogously for the other variables, a bar denotes the respective total volumes.
𝐸𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 represents a vector of two dummy variables indicating whether a country maintains
a currency peg to the USD or the EUR respectively. 𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 stands for imports to country
i from reserve-currency country k at time t6, 𝐷𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 for the amount of external debt and
𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 for foreign currency claims on a country’s banks. Finally 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 denotes a country-
and time-specific error term.
We estimate three models with a different set of independent variables separately for
four reserve currencies as dependent variables. Our model specifications separately test
for the effect of imports (Model A), foreign debt (Model B) and foreign currency claims
(Model C) on currency reserves, while all models include currency peg dummies. As
some covariates are not available for the entire set of countries in our sample, the num-
ber of observations strongly depends on the model we choose. Furthermore, as altering
6We decide to follow Beck and Weber (2011) and capture trade-related effects on the currency com-
position by including imports denominated in the reserve currency in the analysis. We reckon imports
to be a preferable measure to exports for trade-related transaction motives as central banks might have
to backstop import payments, for instance in the case of balance-of-payments crises.
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the model also changes the composition of the countries in the sample, models cannot
directly be compared with each other. The censored nature of the data (values for the
dependent variable lie within the range of 0 and 1) makes the use of the Tobit estimator
preferable (Beck & Weber, 2011). As compared to linear models, in non-linear models the
interpretation of the coefficients is less intuitive, for which reason we provide estimates
of the average marginal effects if necessary. Table B1 in the appendix reports country
composition and number of observations across our model specifications.
4.2 Estimation
Exploiting the panel structure of the data, Table 3 presents the results from random
effects Tobit estimations for Model A, which includes currency pegs and import variables
as dependent variables. The actual magnitude of implied changes in currency holdings
can be interpreted in the average marginal effects rather than in the coefficients. The
coefficients typically overestimate the average marginal effects, especially for the JPY
and the GBP regressions with a substantial amount of left-censored observations (i.e.
currency share equal to 0). The coefficient of the USD peg is significantly positive in the
regression for the USD and significantly negative in the regression for the EUR. On the
contrary, the coefficient for the EUR peg is significantly negative in the USD regression
and significantly positive in the EUR regression. We suspect a stronger impact of a USD
peg to the USD share given a presumed different rationale of pegging to the USD. Pegging
to the EUR might be more driven by historical ties with western European economies. For
the case of eastern European countries, we consider the integration in western European
value chains and the wish to join the euro area in the future explaining factors for an
anchorage of a national currency to the EUR (however, joining the euro area in the
future requires exchange rate stability in general and not increased levels of EUR reserve
holdings in particular). The fact that several former French colonial countries in Africa
have replaced pegs to the French franc with EUR pegs, when the latter was introduced,
speak for this assumption of historical ties.
Indeed in the EUR regression the effect of the EUR peg is economically much less
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pronounced when compared to the effect of the USD peg on USD holdings. Generally
speaking, countries using a currency peg want to hold relatively larger reserves in the
given currency in order to back the exchange rate to which they committed. At the same
time, relative holdings of the other main currencies are reduced. The average marginal
effect of the USD peg is 0.365. All other things equal, the introduction of a USD peg
corresponds to an increase of the USD share by 36.5 percentage points. The peg to the
EUR marginally increases EUR holdings by 4 percentage points.
Table 3: Estimation results: Model A, Tobit
Dependent variable
USD EUR JPY GBP
pegUSD 0.491*** -0.597*** 0.028 0.016
(0.066) (0.056) (0.029) (0.038)
pegEUR -0.235*** 0.057** 0.006 -0.048***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.014) (0.015)
importsfromUSA 0.111 -0.365 0.351** -0.139
(0.276) (0.272) (0.137) (0.144)
importsfromEA -0.203** -0.116 -0.049 -0.010
(0.081) (0.085) (0.039) (0.040)
importsfromJapan -0.973* -0.364 1.366*** 0.238
(0.565) (0.471) (0.237) (0.333)
importsfromUK -0.521 0.041 0.391** 0.437**
(0.413) (0.360) (0.180) (0.184)
Observations 468 403 486 468
Wald 𝜒2 167.86 161.06 74.52 18.11
Prob>Wald 𝜒2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
Notes: This table displays the results of panel tobit regres-
sions. The heads of the columns denote the respective depen-
dent variables. Emitting countries are excluded for regressions
featuring their domestic currencies. Standard errors are in pa-
rentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at
5% and * significance at 10%.
Concerning trade, we find a significantly negative coefficient for imports from the euro
area in the USD regression but we do not find imports from the US to be significantly
correlated to EUR shares. In terms of average marginal effects, a 1 percentage point
increase of imports from the euro area is correlated to a decrease of 0.15 percentage
points in the USD share. Imports from Japan and the UK have a significantly positive
influence on the share of the JPY and the GBP, respectively. On average, a 1 percentage
point increase in imports from Japan and the UK relate to increases of 0.44 and 0.14
percentage points of the JPY and GBP share respectively. Central banks might to some
16
degree be obliged to finance foreign trade with accumulated reserves (Soesmanto et al.,
2015), thus rationalizing the finding that increased imports from the euro area or Japan
reduce a central bank’s propensity to hold USD relative to other currencies. Contrarily,
we do not find imports from the US and the euro area to be associated with increases in
the USD share and the EUR share respectively. Our interpretation is that the transaction
motive seems to hold for the two large currencies in terms of the effect of currency pegs,
but less so for trade patterns. For the two smaller reserve currencies JPY and GBP the
trade relations with the emitting countries appear to be more relevant in terms of the
accumulation of reserves.
Table 4 displays results for both Models B and C, incorporating debt and liabilities
of domestic banks denominated in foreign reserve currencies respectively. We focus on
regressions with the shares of the USD and the EUR as dependent variables. Using
these alternative explanatory variables reduces the number of observations substantially
as most countries in our sample are either not indebted in foreign currencies or do not
report so. Similarly, for foreign currency liabilities the sample size is reduced compared
to Model A. Column 1 shows that debts denominated in both USD and EUR have
a significantly negative association with the USD share. Column 3 reports the same
relationship for liabilities denominated in both main reserve currencies and the USD
share respectively. The negative coefficients for debt and liabilities denominated in USD
can be interpreted similarly to the insignificant effect of imports from the US on USD
shares reported earlier. USD shares might not necessarily be driven by bilateral proxies
of economic interdependence but instead by a premium stemming from its role as the
prime reserve currency.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our findings related to Model A. In order
to control for country heterogeneity we employ in total three region fixed effects for
the Americas, Europe and Asia. Adding country fixed effects overfits the model as the
specification is not left with sufficient variation over time to identify the effects of our
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Table 4: Estimation results: Models B and C, Tobit
Dependent variable
USD EUR USD EUR
pegUSD 0.000 -0.040 0.319* -1.000
(0.064) (0.088) (0.190) (20.449)
pegEUR -0.544*** 0.626*** -0.060 0.040
(0.137) (0.138) (0.056) (0.056)
debtUSD -0.556*** 0.251
(0.161) (0.214)
debtEUR -0.536*** 0.311
(0.148) (0.199)
debtJPY -0.357 0.417
(0.335) (0.455)
debtGBP 5.208 -2.039
(3.832) (5.312)
USDliabilities -0.438*** -0.284
(0.130) (0.254)
EURliabilities -0.432* 0.195
(0.221) (0.339)
JPYliabilities 0.825** -0.214
(0.343) (0.415)
GBPliabilities 0.562 -0.095
(0.428) (0.555)
Observations 117 117 149 115
Wald 𝜒2 37.94 28.41 59.71 19.00
Prob>Wald 𝜒2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
Notes: This table displays the results of panel tobit regressions
of models B and C. The heads of the columns denote the re-
spective dependent variables. Emitting countries are excluded
for regressions featuring their domestic currencies. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, **
significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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covariates. We present the results of estimating our benchmark Model A including region
fixed effects in Table B2 in the appendix. In our benchmark models we normalize imports
to 0 for imports from emitting countries in regressions analyzing the determinants of other
currency shares (i.e. imports from the euro area are set to 0 for euro area countries in
the USD regression). Doing so prevents further sample attrition, particularly in the
USD, JPY and GBP regressions as euro area countries are retained in the sample. As a
robustness check we add currency emission fixed effects to our benchmark model. The
regressions from Model A are estimated including a dummy for the United States, the UK
and one dummy for all euro area countries. We present the results of this specification
in Table B3 in the appendix. The results for these two alterations remain qualitatively
very similar compared to our benchmark model.
Additionally, we alter estimation methodologies for sensitivity analyzes. We confront
the results of the Tobit approach with results of random effects OLS panel regressions
and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) pioneered by Zellner (1962). SUR appear
to be a plausible choice as by definition there is a dependence between the respective
currency shares (shares add up to 1). Concretely, SUR allows the estimation of a system
of equations with correlated error terms. Taking into account such correlations increa-
ses efficiency compared to the estimation of separate equations using OLS. For instance,
Soesmanto et al. (2015) advocate the use of the SUR technique when examining deter-
minants of international reserve holdings of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). We
focus on comparing the results from the different regression techniques for the two main
currencies USD and EUR and for our main Model A.
Table B4 in the appendix contrasts the results for regressions explaining the USD
share. The system of equations we estimate with the SUR estimator consists of three
linear equations explaining the USD share, the EUR share and the aggregated share of all
remaining currencies. By subsuming all other currencies in one share we want to reduce
the number of coefficients to be estimated and focus on explaining the choice between
the two leading currencies. For USD shares in Model A, OLS and SUR estimates broadly
confirm our findings from Tobit estimations. In the regressions from all three methodo-
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logies, coefficients of the currency pegs are economically relevant and highly significant.
The previous finding of trade not being decisive in the accumulation of USD shares is
confirmed in the SUR regression which even features a negative coefficient on imports
from the US. Coefficients on other trade variables, however, are intuitive. Unlike the
other regressions, the SUR regression results yield negative and statistically significant
estimates on imports from all other three reserve currency countries, suggesting the rele-
vance of trade patterns. Table B5 in the appendix compares the results across regression
techniques for the EUR. Similarly to the USD regressions, the qualitative results concer-
ning the relations between currency pegs and currency shares are supported in the two
alternative regressions techniques. Further, the SUR regression yields supportive results
for the impact of trade patterns on the accumulation of the EUR currency share as the
coefficient on imports from the euro area is positive and statistically significant.
In sum, results are mostly robust for currency peg and trade variables and can explain
international reserve compositions reasonably well. Models B and C acknowledge the
importance of international debt and international bank claims but present mixed results.
In the following sections, we rely on our baseline Model A as a workhorse model.
4.4 Effect of the Euro Crisis on Euro Holdings
In the first decade after the introduction of the common European currency, the EUR
share experienced a steady increase in international reserve holdings. The outbreak of the
euro crisis in 2010 marked a turning point, as since then the EUR share has constantly lost
ground. IMF COFER data document a peak in 2009 with a share of 28% of total allocated
foreign reserves. Our more eurocentric data suggest the year 2008 was already a break
date and document a EUR share in total foreign reserves of nearly 38% for that year. In
both data sets, the EUR shares have decreased by 9 and 8 percentage points, respectively,
since the respective peak years. Not surprisingly, scenarios of the EUR surpassing the
USD as the world’s main reserve currency usually date from the years prior to the euro
crisis (see Chinn and Frankel (2008)). Figure 3 illustrates the initially increasing and
subsequently decreasing importance of the EUR as an international reserve currency, with
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2007 as a base year (2007=100). In terms of the euro’s share in international reserves,
2015 was the currency’s temporary nadir according to our data since 2001.
Figure 3: EUR share in total reserves
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Notes: IMF COFER. This graph shows the EUR share in international reserves
according to our data (bars) and to the IMF COFER data (line). 2007 is defined as
base year (=100%) to illustrate the parallel evolution. The vertical red line separates
the sample into pre-crisis and post-crisis subsamples. [Please use colors in print.]
Source: IMF COFER, own data (mostly annual reports of central banks, see Table
A3).
We use Chow tests to verify a structural break for EUR shares triggered by the euro
crisis in 2010. To further examine effects of the euro crisis, we add a crisis dummy to
capture a direct effect and interaction terms to capture an indirect effect to the baseline
regression (see Table 5). Crisis years are marked by a dummy variable (1 for all years after
2010, 0 otherwise). Interaction terms are constructed as products of the dummy variable
and the six independent variables of the baseline regression. We find a significant and
negative coefficient for the crisis dummy in columns 2 and 3, which traces the reduction in
EUR holdings post-2010. The coefficient of -0.08 in column 2 corresponds to a marginal
reduction of EUR shares of around 6 percentage points. Interestingly, the interaction
terms of the crisis dummy and covariates displayed in columns 3 and 4 suggest that
channels based on transaction motives are strengthened after the euro crisis. For instance,
the effect of a currency peg to the USD is more positive, the effects of imports from the
US and the UK are more negative and the effect of imports from the euro area are
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more positive after the crisis. For the latter, note that the total effect of imports from
the euro area after the crisis is still negative and insignificant. Yet, the tendency for
estimates after the crisis suggests the interpretation that the euro crisis has damaged the
attractiveness of the EUR on international reserve markets, causing a flight to quality
out of the EUR. Consequently, after the crisis currency shares of the EUR might be
explained more by transaction motives rather than stemming from the status of being a
prime reserve currency.
Table 5: Estimation results with crisis interactions
Dependent variable = EUR shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pegUSD -0.597*** -0.535*** -0.579*** -0.590***
(0.056) (0.054) (0.057) (0.054)
pegEUR 0.057** 0.090*** 0.071** 0.066**
(0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028)
importsfromUSA -0.365 -0.413* -0.423* -0.527**
(0.272) (0.246) (0.246) (0.239)
importsfromEA -0.116 -0.092 -0.107 -0.246***
(0.085) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
importsfromJapan -0.364 -1.780*** -1.678*** -1.768***
(0.471) (0.483) (0.488) (0.469)
importsfromUK 0.041 -0.060 -0.097 1.462***
(0.360) (0.339) (0.340) (0.445)
Crisis -0.080*** -0.090*** -0.035
(0.011) (0.013) (0.040)
Crisis x pegUSD 0.104** 0.108**
(0.053) (0.053)
Crisis x pegEUR 0.032 -0.017
(0.025) (0.026)
Crisis x importsfromUSA -0.237**
(0.098)
Crisis x importsfromEA 0.176**
(0.088)
Crisis x importsfromJapan -0.376
(0.602)
Crisis x importsfromUK -2.127***
(0.428)
Observations 403 403 403 403
Wald 𝜒2 161.06 229.42 236.99 300.85
Prob>Wald 𝜒2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: This table displays the results of panel Tobit regressions with
random effects for the EUR using interactions with a euro crisis dummy
which is one for 2011 and all subsequent years. Regressions exclude the
euro area and its member states as issuers of the EUR. Standard errors are
in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and *
significance at 10%.
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4.5 Actual and Model Predicted Currency Compositions
In this section, we confront model predicted and actual currency shares. We restrict
ourselves to the two main international reserve currencies the USD and the EUR and
make use of our baseline model, i.e. Tobit-type panel regressions with currency pegs and
import shares. Figure 4 plots predicted and actual shares for both currencies for 2016.
The majority of shares predicted for the USD and the EUR lie in the range between 40
and 60%. The model provides a reasonable fit on average as it is capable of assigning
larger currency shares for those countries featuring larger actual shares. The correlation
coefficients between actual and predicted shares are 0.64 for the USD and 0.48 the EUR
respectively. Comparing actual to predicted currency shares further reveals interesting
patterns about the fit of our model. The parsimony of the model does not capture
country idiosyncrasies driving extreme choices (i.e. currency shares close to 0 or 1) in
currency compositions. For instance, an important number of Latin American countries
seemingly have a strong preference for holding USD-denominated assets while EUR shares
are regularly larger than predicted in neighboring countries of the euro area. Potentially,
other factors beyond trade patterns and currency pegs, such as geopolitical factors, are
relevant for these countries. Further, many emitting countries exhibit large holdings of the
respective other main currency, including the US with a large share in EUR-denominated
assets due to a missing choice between two rivaling currencies.
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Figure 4: Actual and model predicted shares of USD and EUR (2016)
Notes: This table displays model predictions and corresponding actual values for
USD shares (blue) and EUR shares (red) by country for 2016. For prediction we
use our benchmark model with pegs and imports as explanatory variables (Model
A). [Please use colors in print.]
Source: Own data (mostly annual reports of central banks, see Table A3).
Lastly, we predict currency compositions of the three largest - non-disclosing - reserve
holders China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, which together account for nearly 45% of world-
wide international reserves in 2016 (see Table A1). Substituting respective import shares
and currency pegs into our baseline estimation equation for USD, EUR, JPY and GBP
we obtain the following predicted shares. For China, our model predicts a composition
of its international reserves of 39% USD, 37% EUR, 11% JPY and 7% GBP assets. The
model further suggests that Japanese international reserves are invested to 47% in USD,
to 40% in EUR and to 7% in GBP. For Saudi Arabia, the US peg translates itself via an
economically significant coefficient into a highly USD-dominated, predicted reserve com-
position, despite lively trade with the euro area. The predicted foreign reserves portfolio
consists of 63% USD, 13% EUR, 11% JPY and 8% GBP-denominated assets.7
7We normalize our predictions such that currency shares for each country sum to unity. We do so by
assuming a constant currency share of 8.5% for currencies other than USD, EUR, JPY and GBP, which
is the average for the disclosing countries in 2016, and by assigning the remaining 91.5% to the four main
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For the three countries of interest, these estimation results are difficult to compare
to actual compositions about which little is known. Nevertheless, possible bands within
which currency shares may fluctuate can be derived from statements by economists and
analysts. For China, estimates assume a USD share between 60% and 70% of its interna-
tional reserves, a EUR share between 20% and 30%, and JPY and GBP shares together
between 5% and 10% (see Hu et al. (2010), pp. 8-9, Morrison and Labonte (2013), p.
5, Wildau (2014), Neely (2017), p. 1).8 For Japan, a high USD share in the country’s
international reserves appears realistic. For instance, Wong (2007) is among the few
committing herself to an, in our opinion, plausible USD share between 83% and 89%.
For Saudi Arabia, which is regularly among the largest holders of foreign reserves, mar-
ket observers assume central bank foreign reserves to be denominated almost exclusively
in USD (Torchia, 2015). Bearing in mind the challenge of predicting extreme currency
shares and the role of political factors which our model omits, our predictions seem to
follow broadly the tendencies of USD dominance for these three countries.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine determinants of the composition of international reserves and
aim to disentangle the impact of the euro crisis on currency compositions. We compile
a new dataset based on publicly available central bank data on international reserves to
overcome the lack of comprehensive data in this area. Relating these data to a selection
of country-specific factors reveals that trade patterns and currency pegs are primary
determinants of foreign currency holdings. Our analysis suggests the importance of tran-
saction motives in determining the composition of currency shares. In particular, we find
correlations between currency pegs and imports. Thus, we can confirm findings from
papers based on access to confidential IMF data (see Heller and Knight (1978), Dooley et
al. (1989) and Eichengreen et al. (2000)). We also examine other possible determinants.
currencies based on our model predictions.
8Concerning the impact of the euro crisis on Chinese EUR holdings, Wang and Freeman (2013) write
that “the European sovereign debt crisis has not produced a significant reduction in the share of China’s
holding of euro assets, but it may have discouraged any increase”.
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Foreign debt and international bank claims appear to play a role in the composition of
foreign currency holdings, but our results are mixed.
We further show that the euro crisis caused a break in the rising relative significance
of EUR holdings. In pre-crisis years and since the EUR introduction in 1999, the EUR
was able to establish itself as the world’s second reserve currency after the USD and was
even considered a rival to the USD as the world’s main international reserve currency.
Since 2010, however, EUR shares have been declining by trend. Additionally, the euro
crisis potentially strengthened transaction motives for the determination of EUR shares,
which we cautiously interpret as a setback for the EUR as a rival the USD as the main
international reserve currency.
Additionally, this paper argues that a simple model can, on average, explain currency
compositions reasonably well, whereas deviations from predicted shares in some cases
suggest that additional factors such as geopolitical factors might play a role. We use
our model to predict currency shares for China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, the largest -
non-disclosing - reserve holding countries. Our model predicts USD dominance in these
countries’ reserve holdings.
The development of international reserves remains of growing general interest for
academics and policy makers due to its relevance for currency markets, exchange rates,
geopolitical factors and the global economy as a whole. Academic research can further
contribute to explain both recent and future dynamics in this field.
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Table A1: Ten biggest holders of international reserves (2016)
Rank Country International
reserves (in bn
USD, 2016)
Cumulated
share of
worldwide total
Percent increase
2010-2016
Percent increase
2005-2016
1 China 3,010.5 28.1% -5.4% 182.3%
2 Japan 1,158.3 38.9% -5.2% 32.4%
3 Switzerland 634.9 44.9% 134.2% 1,599.3%
4 Saudi Arabia 526.0 49.8% 0.1% 134.3%
5 Taiwan 434.,2 53.8% 12.6% 63.1%
6 Hong Kong 386.1 57.4% 35.4% 190.0%
7 Korea 361.7 60.8% 21.3% 51.7%
8 Brazil 356.8 64.1% 3.9% 319.0%
9 India 336.6 67.3% 28.0% 97.8%
10 Russia 308.0 70.2% -30.2% 4.3%
Notes: The table shows international reserves volumes without gold for the ten major holding countries.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Table A2: Data availability on the composition of international reserves (2016)
IMF International
Financial Statistics
(IFS)
IMF Currency Composition of
Foreign Exchange Reserves
(COFER)
Individual country
data (own
compilation)
Countries (total) 191 149 (97 names disclosed) 37
Industrial countries 38 39 22
Developing countries 153 58 15
Total international
reserves (2016)
10.7tn USD 10.7tn USD 2.4tn USD
Breakdown of total by
currency
no yes yes
Breakdown of
currencies by country
no no yes
Frequency of data monthly/quarterly quarterly annual
Notes: IFS volumes are presented according to the international liquidity statistics data selection and
exclude gold. IMF COFER volumes correspond to the “total foreign exchange reserves” data selection.
The table represents 2016 values.
Source: IMF IFS, IMF COFER, Wooldridge (2006), own data (mostly annual reports of central banks,
see Table A3).
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Table A3: Data sources reserve holdings
Country Years Source
Australia
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia*
Croatia
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Euro area
Finland
Georgia
Germany
Hong Kong
Iceland
Israel
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Moldova
Mozambique
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovak Rep.
Slovenia**
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
USA
Uruguay
1997-2016
2001-2016
2000-2016
2001-2016
2005-2016
2009-2016
2001-2016
1999-2016
2006-2016
2006-2016
2001-2016
1998-2016
2000-2016
2000-2016
2007-2016
2011-2016
2005-2016
2005-2016
1993-2010
2010-2016
2011-2016
2007-2016
2002-2016
2011-2016
1998-2016
2000-2016
2011-2013
2004-2015
2005-2016
2007-2016
1999-2008
1995-2016
1999-2016
1996-2016
1997-2016
1999-2016
2004-2016
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Report on the Management of Canada’s Official International Reserves
Annual Report
Foreign Reserves Management Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Foreign Exchange Reserves Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
Balance of Payments Statistics
Annual Report
Annual Report
Annual Report
UK International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity Template
U.S. International Reserve Position (Treasury)
IMF SDSS Reserve Template
Notes: This table reports the sources for the data we collect on country specific reserve holdings. “Annual
Report” refers to the annual reports of a country’s central bank. * denotes gap in 2010, 2012, 2014. ** denotes
gap in 2007.
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Table A4: Sample composition
Europe Americas Asia Australia and Africa
Oceania
Industrial countries Czech Rep. Lithuania Canada Hong Kong Australia
Denmark Netherlands USA Israel New Zealand
Euro Area Norway
Finland Slovakia
Germany Slovenia
Iceland Sweden
Italy Switzerland
Latvia UK
Emerging economies Bosnia Moldova Chile Georgia Mozambique
Bulgaria Poland Colombia Philippines
Croatia Romania Peru
Macedonia Russia Uruguay
Notes: The table shows the composition of our sample. We have data for 23 countries in Europe plus the
euro area. The further distribution across continents is: Americas (6), Asia (4), Australia and Oceania (2)
and Africa (1). In terms of economic development our sample includes 21 industrial countries and the euro
area and 15 emerging economies following the IMF World Economic Outlook classification in 2016.
Source: Own data (mostly annual reports of central banks, see Table A3).
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Table A5: Country specific international reserve composition (shares in %)
USD EUR JPY GBP others
Country 2006 2016 2006 2016 2006 2016 2006 2016 2006 2016
Australia 45.0 55.0 45.0 20.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 15
Bosnia 0.0 0.1 99.9 99.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bulgaria 0.6 0.5 99.4 99.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Canada 53.4 67.4 45.3 21.0 1.3 1.4 0.0 10.2 0.0 0
Chile 71.0 69.9 24.9 13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 16.2
Colombia* 85.0 88.6 12.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4
Croatia 14.5 21.3 85.5 75.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9
Czech Rep. 35.6 20.1 55.3 59.5 4.4 3.0 4.8 1.3 0.0 16.1
Denmark* 15.2 26.0 71.8 73.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 6.0 0.9
Euro area* 83 84.3 0.0 0.0 17 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Finland 44.7 78.6 0.0 0.0 6.4 8.2 40.4 13.3 8.5 0.0
Georgia 76.5 84.2 23.3 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 11.2
Germany 98.2 92.1 0.0 0.0 1.8 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2
Hong Kong 87.0 91.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 8.4
Iceland* 20.9 48.8 67.5 37.2 1.3 3.0 7.0 10.7 3.3 0.4
Israel / 68.7 / 28.6 / 0.0 / 2.7 / 0.0
Italy 61.4 68.1 0.0 0.0 8.7 14.7 26.5 9.2 3.4 8.0
Latvia 40.0 69.6 50.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 17.7 0.0 12.7
Lithuania 0.0 / 100.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 /
Macedonia / 38.1 / 56.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 5.9
Moldova / 69.7 / 12.9 / 0.0 / 17.2 / 0.2
Mozambique* 65.8 46.3 15.1 4.9 0.0 0.0 7.0 2.3 12.1 46.6
Netherlands 100 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
New Zealand 25.2 22.6 23.3 24.5 5.3 6.0 10.4 13.4 35.8 33.5
Norway 32.1 51.4 40.4 29.2 0.0 8.0 12.4 7.4 15.1 4.0
Peru 82.2 88.6 15.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.4 2.7 0.9
Philippines* / 78.8 / 5.0 / 10.0 / 0.0 / 6.2
Poland 45.0 44.0 40.0 27.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.0 5.0 29.0
Romania 27.2 11.8 68.8 75.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 13.2
Russia 47.0 44.8 42.4 39.9 0.8 0.0 9.8 9.5 0.0 5.8
Slovak Rep. 27.3 / 72.7 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 /
Slovenia 14.4 99.8 71.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.2
Sweden 30.0 55.0 50.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 10.0 3.9 10.0 7.7
Switzerland 32.8 33.3 47.0 44.4 5.1 6.6 10.1 6.6 5.0 9.1
UK 20.5 19.6 73.6 54.5 3.3 6.3 0.0 0.0 2.6 19.6
USA 0.0 0.0 61.2 59.0 38.9 41.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 98.6 96.8 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8
Notes: This table reports shares of country specific reserve holdings. If currency shares
are unavailable for a specific year, we report the nearest data available (max. ± 2 years).
This is marked by *.
Source: Own data (mostly annual reports of central banks, see Table A3).
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Table A6: Explanatory variables
Variable Description Scale Source
Peg Hard or soft peg to reserve currency
according to IMF classification of
exchange rate regimes.
Dummy
variable
IMF Annual Report on Exchange Rate
Arrangements and Exchange Rate
Restrictions (AREAER)
Imports Ratio of imports from currency issuing
country to total imports
% value UN Comtrade Database and Eurostat
Foreign
currency
debt
Ratio of external long-term public debt
denominated in the respective reserve
currency to total external public debt
% value World Bank International Debt
Statistics (IDS)
Liabilities to
foreign
banks
Ratio of liabilities of the domestic
banking sector to foreign banks
denominated in the respective reserve
currency to total liabilities
% value Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) locational banking statistics
(LBS)
Notes: This table reports the data sources for the explanatory data used throughout the empirical
analysis.
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B. Estimation
Table B1: Model specifications
Model Explanatory variables Countries included N
A pegUSD, pegEUR, importsfromUSA,
importsfromEA, importsfromJapan,
importsfromUK
Australia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Euro Area,
Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hong
Kong, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,
Mozambique, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay
403-486
B pegUSD, pegEUR, debtUSD,
debtEUR, debtJPY, debtGBP
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Georgia,
Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique,
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia
117
C pegUSD, pegEUR, liabilitiesUSD,
liabilitiesEUR, liabilitiesJPY,
liabilitiesGBP
Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Philippines,
Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United States
115-149
Notes: The table shows the country composition of the regression samples and the number of observations
across different models. Differences in the number of the observations within models result from omitting
the respective emitting countries.
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Table B2: Estimation results: Model A including region fixed effects, Tobit
Dependent variable
USD EUR JPY GBP
pegUSD 0.474*** -0.582*** 0.029 0.019
(0.067) (0.056) (0.029) (0.037)
pegEUR -0.232*** 0.049* 0.005 -0.051***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015)
importsfromUSA -0.373 0.007 0.326** -0.031
(0.318) (0.263) (0.148) (0.160)
importsfromEA -0.151* -0.210** -0.055 -0.025
(0.085) (0.083) (0.042) (0.042)
importsfromJapan -0.821 -0.113 1.427*** 0.228
(0.580) (0.467) (0.244) (0.334)
importsfromUK -0.243 -0.149 0.393** 0.389**
(0.422) (0.356) (0.182) (0.186)
Observations 468 403 486 468
Wald 𝜒2 182.11 192.47 75.00 22.33
Prob>Wald 𝜒2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008
Notes: This table displays the results of panel tobit regressi-
ons. The heads of the columns denote the respective dependent
variables. Regional dummies for the Americas, Europe and Asia
are included in the regressions but not reported in this table.
Emitting countries are excluded for regressions featuring their
domestic currencies. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** de-
notes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance
at 10%.
Table B3: Estimation results: Model A including currency emission fixed effects, Tobit
Dependent variable
USD EUR JPY GBP
pegUSD 0.553*** -0.594*** 0.028 0.031
(0.057) (0.057) (0.028) (0.034)
pegEUR -0.127*** 0.059** 0.012 -0.022
(0.028) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015)
importsfromUSA 0.374 -0.374 0.295** -0.116
(0.246) (0.271) (0.121) (0.146)
importsfromEA -0.100 -0.113 -0.041 -0.012
(0.072) (0.085) (0.038) (0.042)
importsfromJapan -0.645 -0.391 1.296*** 0.510
(0.486) (0.474) (0.226) (0.324)
importsfromUK -0.847** 0.058 0.430** 0.367**
(0.356) (0.360) (0.177) (0.176)
Observations 468 403 486 468
Wald 𝜒2 387.47 162.59 95.10 .
Prob>Wald 𝜒2 0.000 0.000 0.000 .
Notes: This table displays the results of panel tobit regressi-
ons. The heads of the columns denote the respective dependent
variables. Emitting countries are excluded for regressions featu-
ring their domestic currencies. Currency emitting dummies for
the US, the UK and one dummy for all euro area countries are
included in the regressions but not reported in this table. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%,
** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
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Table B4: Comparison of estimation results: Model A (USD)
Tobit OLS SUR
pegUSD 0.491*** 0.450*** 0.245***
(0.066) (0.174) (0.001)
pegEUR -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.271***
(0.030) (0.086) (0.001)
importsfromUSA 0.111 0.103 -0.076***
(0.276) (0.331) (0.013)
importsfromEA -0.203** -0.220 -0.081***
(0.081) (0.262) (0.004)
importsfromJapan -0.973* -1.007 -0.447***
(0.565) (1.069) (0.018)
importsfromUK -0.521 -0.527 -0.847***
(0.413) (0.640) (0.014)
Observations 468 468 385
Wald 𝜒2 167.86 27.67
Prob>Wald 𝜒2 0.000 0.000
Notes: This table displays the results of panel tobit, random effects OLS and
SUR regressions with the USD as the dependent variable. The heads of the
columns refer to the respective estimation technique. All regressions exclude
the US as emiting country. The SUR regression omits all emitting countries.
The system of equations estimated with SUR consists of the three linear equa-
tions explaining the USD share, the EUR share and the aggregated share of
all remaining currencies respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***
denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.
Table B5: Comparison of estimation results: Model A (EUR)
Tobit OLS SUR
pegUSD -0.597*** -0.535*** -0.323***
(0.056) (0.202) (0.025)
pegEUR 0.057** 0.079* 0.494***
(0.028) (0.046) (0.015)
importsfromUSA -0.365 -0.502 0.024
(0.272) (0.458) (0.249)
importsfromEA -0.116 -0.022 0.203***
(0.085) (0.097) (0.046)
importsfromJapan -0.364 -0.582 0.508
(0.471) (0.802) (0.320)
importsfromUK 0.041 0.054 2.442***
(0.360) (0.527) (0.352)
Observations 403 403 385
Wald 𝜒2 161.06 20.68
Prob>Wald 𝜒2 0.000 0.002
Notes: This table displays the results of panel tobit, random effects OLS
and SUR regressions with the EUR as the dependent variable. The heads
of the columns refer to the respective estimation technique. All regressions
exclude the euro area countries as emiting country. The SUR regression omits
all emitting countries. The system of equations estimated with SUR consists
of the three linear equations explaining the USD share, the EUR share and
the aggregated share of all remaining currencies respectively. Standard errors
are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and
* significance at 10%.
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